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

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THE

APHORISMS

OF THE

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY,

BY

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GAUTAMA,

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

1755

VISWANÁTHA.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

PRINTED, FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE,
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PREFACE.

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THE great body of the Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1851.

THE APHORISMS OF THE NYÁYA.

INTRODUCTION.

a. [The *Nyáya-sútra-vritti,* or "Explication of the Aphorisms of the Nyáya," commences with the following exordium.]

b. Salutation to the illustrious Ganeśa!

c. May he, the splendour of whose gracefulness of person surpasses ten million of Cupids;—who made the joy—and O how delightful it was!—of the bevies of the dames of Vraja;—whose body is dark as the teeming rain-cloud, and who haunts no temple save the mind;—may he, the some one [whom, as the well known Krishṇa, I need not name], promote the felicity of the inhabitants of the three worlds.*

d. In order to produce great good-luck, we meditate on the beauty of the toe-nails of Bhaváni, which [beauty], taking an exquisite aspect as it was associated with the ruddy lustre of the newly applied lac-dye, seemed a sort of lovely ornament of Śiva's head—when his head was bowed down [at her feet] to deprecate her haughty displeasure—eclipsing [—as the beauty of the toe-nails

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* श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥ वपुर्लीलालक्ष्मीजितमदनकोटिर्व्रजवधू जनानामानन्दं कमपि कमनीयं विरचयन्। स कोऽपि प्रेमाणं प्रथयतु मनोमन्दिरचरस्त्रिलोकीलोकानां सजलजलदश्यामलतनुः ॥ १ ॥

then did—] the resplendent beauty of the twilight Moon* [which is the *usual* ornament of Śiva's head.]

e. I reverence him [—meaning GAUTAMA—], the resplendent, who has eyes in his feet [as well as in his head—though how, or to serve what purpose, does not seem to be known—], by means of the rays of whose dialectics [—meaning thereby the body of doctrine which he bequeathed to the world—]the virtuous get over the whole darkness that was within them.†

f. We reverence our father, VIDYÁNIVÁSA [the abode of learning], who is as it were a combination in one—of the two gods of wisdom and of justice, the ornament of the globe of the fair earth, a masculine form as it were of the goddess of eloquence, the producer of confident scholarship [in those enjoying the advantage of being his pupils], in liberality like another Karṇa incarnate, towards the wretched ingenious in his kindness, whose fair fame prevades the universe.‡

g. I make the dust of my preceptor's feet my pilot [in the voyage on which I am going to adventure—for I am] seeking to promote skill, and resolved in mind that even the dull-witted shall [be supplied at all events with the means to] understand—

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* संयुक्तां युक्तरूपामभिनवनिहितालक्तकारक्तभासा सन्ध्यापीयूषभानोरतिरुचिरतरां चूर्णयन्तीमभिख्यां। मानव्यामोकनम्रत्रिपुरहरशिरोरम्यभूषाविशेषं भूयो भव्यं विधातुं चरणनखरुचं भावयामो भवान्याः ॥ २ ॥

† यदीयतर्ककिरणैरान्तरध्वान्तसन्ततिं। सन्तस्तरन्ति भास्वन्तमच्युतपादं नमामि तम् ॥ ३ ॥

‡ अद्वैतं गुरुधर्मयोरिव लसच्छ्रामण्डलीमण्डनं रूपं किञ्चन पौरुषं गिर इव प्रागल्भ्यसम्पादकं। दाने कर्णमिवावतीर्णमपरं दीने दयादक्षिणं तातं विश्वविसारिचारुयशसं विद्यानिवासं नुमः ॥ ४ ॥

without much effort, and the intelligent as mere play,—the wide [and all-embracing] system of the Nyáya.*

h. May this work of VISWANÁTHA the son of VIDYÁNIVÁSA conduce to the gratification of the sage the fine-witted and the unenvious.†

i. Now the on-lookers do not engage [in any study offered to their attention] without having come to feel an interest in the *motive* [—i. e. in the end, to the attainment of which the study is calculated to lead]; therefore the end is to be mentioned first.‡ [The end proposed is the escaping from liability to transmigration, and the attainment of tranquil and eternally uninterrupted beatitude:—and, as the declaration of this end is requisite in order to gain attention at the outset—] therefore, for the declaration thereof, the venerable one who has eyes in his feet [—see *e.*—] aphorises in the first place as follows.§

SECTION I.

THE END OF THE PROPOSED ENQUIRY.

Enunciation of the things, the right notion of which leads to Beatitude.

प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयव तर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजाति निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः॥१॥

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* अलसमतिरपीदं विस्तृतं न्यायशास्त्रं विरहितबहुयत्नो लीलया वेत्तु विद्वान्। इति विनिहितचेताः कौशलं कर्तुकामो गुरुचरणरजोऽहं कर्णधारीकरोमि॥ ५॥

† विद्यानिवाससदनोः क्षतिरेषा विश्वनाथस्य। विदुषामतिसूक्ष्मधियाममत्सराणां मुदे भवितां॥ ६॥

‡ प्रयोजनमनभिसन्धाय प्रेक्षावन्तो न प्रवर्तन्ते। अतः प्रथमं प्रयोजनमभिधानीयम्॥

§ अतस्तत्प्रतिपादनाय भगवानक्षपादः प्रथमं सूत्रयति॥

No. 1.—Proof [—i. e. the instrument of right notion—3. *a.**—] ; that which [—as having a proof—] is the object of right notion; doubt; motive; familiar fact; scholastic tenet; confutation; ascertainment; disquisition; controversy; cavil; semblance of a reason; perversion; futility; and unfitness to be argued with;——from knowing the truth in regard to these [sixteen things], there is the attainment of the summum bonum (*ni'śreyasa.*)

a. But then [—there is no denying—] the knowledge of truth is not the *immediate* cause of Beatitude. Beatitude—to consider it apart—is of two kinds through the distinction of the 'higher' [attainable only on quitting the body], and the 'lower.' Of these the 'lower,' in the shape of 'emancipation while yet in life' (*jívanmukti*), takes place immediately on the attainment of the knowledge of truth [—the sign of a man's having attained to which is his exhibiting a perfect indifference to all that passes around him]. This, moreover, is attained by him who has ascertained the truth in regard to Soul, whose false notions have been removed by incessant application, and who is yet experiencing [—in appearance at least—for, though apparently exposed to hardships, he is generally supposed to feel nothing—the fruit of] past deeds;—but the 'higher' [is attained by him] by certain *degrees*. To explain the order thereof is the purpose of the following aphorism.†

The order of the steps towards Beatitude.

दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ॥ २ ॥

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* प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणम् ॥ वेद° परि° ॥

† ननु तत्त्वज्ञानस्य न साक्षादेव निःश्रेयसहेतुत्वं। निश्रेयसं तावद् द्विविधं परापरभेदात्। तत्रापरं जीवन्मुक्तिलक्षणं तत्त्वज्ञानानन्तरमेव। तदप्यवधारितात्मतत्त्वस्य नैरन्तर्याभ्यासापहृतमिथ्याज्ञानस्य प्रारब्धं कर्मोपभुञ्जानस्य। परन्तु क्रमेण। तत्र क्रमप्रतिपादनायेदं सूत्रमिति ॥

No. 2.—Pain (*du'kha*), birth (*janman*), activity (*pravritti*), fault (*dosha*), false notions (*mithyá-jnána*),—since, on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next [before] it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them] Beatitude (*apavarga*).

a. [That is to say—] among Pain and the rest [in the foregoing list], whichever are subsequent in order [to others in the list], on the annihilation of these [subsequent ones], since there is the annihilation of the next one—i. e. of the one immediately next it and preceding it—, there is [—in the end—when Pain, the last in the list thus read backwards, has been annihilated,] Beatitude.*

b. Although [—as some one may object—] Beatitude does not come *from* the absence of Pain, but *is* it—still [there is no fault in the form of expression employed in the aphorism, for] the sense of the 5th case here is that of *indifference*† [—i. e. the absence of any difference between the *what* and the *whence*].

c. So much—in the 'Explication of the Aphorisms'—for the topic denominated 'that relating to the *motive*'‡ [for pursuing the enquiry proposed].

d. [The remembering of the order of the steps, in § 2., may be facilitated, to some readers, by availing one's self of the distributively cumulative form of exposition employed in the nursery tale of "The House that Jack built." Thus—

1. *Du'kha.*—This is the '*pain*' that the man had.

2. *Janman.*—This is the '*birth*' [again renewed] that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

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* दुःखादीनां मध्ये यदुत्तरोत्तरं तेषामपाये तदनन्तरस्य तत्सन्निहितस्य पूर्वपूर्वस्यापायादपवर्गः ॥

† यद्यपि दुःखापायान्नापवर्गः किन्तु स एव सः तथाप्यभेद एव तत्र पञ्चम्यर्थः ॥

‡ इति सूत्रवृत्तौ सप्रयोजनाभिधेयप्रकरणम् ॥

Pravritti.—This is '*activity*' (—requiring reward—) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

4. *Dosha.*—This is the '*fault*' (—of 'desire' or 'dislike'—alike to be shunned—or 'stupidity'—) which (—in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all,—) begot the 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

5. *Mithyá-jnána.*—This means the '*wrong-notions*' (of that man unversed in the truth-teaching Nyáya Philosophy) which (—since the man knew no better—) gave rise to the 'fault' (of 'desire' or 'dislike' or 'stupidity') which (—in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all—) begot the 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

6. *Apavarga.*—This last is '*beatitude*'—promised as fruit of the truth-teaching Nyáya Philosophy, which gives us *right* ones instead of the '*wrong* notions,' which gave rise to what GAUTAMA styles a '*fault,*' inasmuch as it mischievously begot the 'activity' carefully shunned by the wise—for 'activity,'—shaping itself in acts that are good or bad, and require reward of a like description,—occasions a man to be born again,—and 'twas this same 'birth' that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.]*

*Mr. Colebrooke, in his celebrated essay on the Nyáya, (see Essays, vol. 1) stating concisely the Nyáya view of the attainment of beatitude, describes (at p. 290) soul as "not earning fresh merit or demerit by deeds done with desire." Here he makes, as GAUTAMA does, the 'desire' (which is one of the three meant by the technical word *dosha* 'fault'—see the Essay, p. 290. 1. 1.—and the present work §18. *a.*—) to be the producer of acts, from which acts, in turn, arise merit or demerit. But, at p. 289, when he says "From acts proceed faults (*dósha*); "including under this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loathing; and error or delusion (*móha*)," he adopts an order the reverse of that enjoined in §18.—see Note on §18. *b.* If the passage in the Essay be correctly edited, it would seem as if Mr. Colebrooke, when giving to his Essay a final revision after having laid it aside for a time, had been struck with the oddness of the expression that "from faults proceed acts," and had reversed it without adverting to the technical definition of 'faults,' in the same sentence, as the *passions* which give *rise* to action. GAUTAMA, the votary of Quietism, gives to

d. Now, since a definition will be looked for [of each of the things enunciated in the aphorism §1] in the order of enunciation, he defines, and divides, Proof—the first enounced.*

SECTION II.

THE INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE IN PROSECUTING THE ENQUIRY.

What are the instruments of right notion.

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ॥ २ ॥

No. 3.—Proofs [—i. e.—see §1—instruments of right notion—] are (1) the deliverances of sense; (2) the recognition of signs; (3) the recognition of likeness; and (4) words.

What is meant by 'right notion' or *knowledge* κατ' ἐξοχην.

a. There, by the root *má* 'to measure,' peculiarised by the emphatic prefix *pra* [—and thus giving the word *pramá*—scilicet 'what takes the *very* measure of its object'—] there is signified a notion [—not dubious, or erroneous,—for notions may be both of these;—but the '*right* notion' denoted by *pramá* is a *knowledge*] in the veriest manner determined [—or distinguished from the bare knowledge that 'this is *something*'—] by the determinate nature of that which [—being the object of the knowledge—] possesses such and such† [determinate nature.—It is,

the passions the name of 'faults' with a significance akin to that which the word bore in the remark of Talleyrand on the murder of the Duc D'Enghien—"ce n'était pas une crime—c'était une *faute*;"—it was an absolute *blunder*. The wise man, according to GAUTAMA, is he who avoids the three *mistakes* of having a liking for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of having a dislike for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of being *stupidly* indifferent, and thereupon acting; instead of being *intelligently* indifferent, and not acting at all.

* अथ यथोद्दिष्टं लक्षणस्यापेक्षितत्वात् प्रथमोद्दिष्टं प्रमाणं लक्षयति विभजतेच ॥

† अत्र तदिति तत्प्रकारकत्वरूपप्रकर्षविशिष्टज्ञानं प्रशब्दविशिष्टेन माधातुना प्रत्याय्यते ॥

in short, the knowledge of a thing *as it is*,—or, in the words of Butler,

"To know *what's what*;—and that's as high
"As metaphysic wit can fly."]

b. That—in virtue of which any thing is the *instrument* of such [right notion as has been just defined]—is what constitutes any thing a *Proof** [or instrument of right notion.]

c. And the knowledge intended to be spoken of here is notion other than *memory*;—so that this [definition of 'Proof' just given] does not extend [where it ought not] to the instrument of *recollection*† [—which we may have to treat of hereafter.]

d. At this point the Explication of the [first] three Aphorisms is completed.‡

e. Now he begins to define, in their order, the [several kinds of 'Proof' which, in the preceding Aphorism, were] divided.§

f. [The four kinds of 'Proof' are usually spoken of as 'Perception,' 'Inference,' 'Comparison,' and 'Testimony.' We may have occasion in the sequel to explain why we think proper to depart from the accustomed from of rendering].

What is meant by a deliverance of sense.

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ४ ॥

No. 4.—By a deliverance of sense is meant knowledge which has arisen from the contact of a sense with its object,—[and this

* तत्करणत्वं प्रमाणत्वम् ॥

† ज्ञानञ्चात्रानुभवो विवक्षितस्तेन स्मृतिकरणे नातिव्याप्तिः ॥

‡ इति त्रिसूत्रीव्याख्या समाप्ता ॥

§ अथ विभक्तानि यथाक्रमं लक्षयितुमारभते ॥

knowledge may be] indeterminate [—as when one in consequence perceives 'this is *something*'—we know not, or think not, what; —but] not erroneous [—for, if erroneous, it would be no 'instrument of right notion:'—or it may be] determinate [—such a degree of attention having been exerted as to determine that 'this is so and so' and not any thing else.]

a. [Now] he defines and divides the 'recognition of a sign.'*

What is meant by the recognition of a sign.

अथ तत्पूर्व्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्व्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो दृष्टञ्च ॥ ५ ॥

No. 5.—Now the recognition of a sign, which is preceded thereby [—i. e. is preceded by a deliverance of sense†—§4—else the recognition of the sign were impossible—] is of three kinds—(1) having [as the sign] the *prior*, or (2) having [as the sign] the *posterior*, or else (3) [consisting in] the *perception of homogeneousness*.

a. [By 'prior'—as explained in our Lecture on the Sánkhya Philosophy, §101, &c.—the author means a '*cause*,'—from which, when recognised, its effect may be inferred as about to follow. So again, by 'posterior' he means an '*effect*'—from which, when recognised, one can infer that such and such a cause has been at work. By the 'perception of homogeneousness' he means the recognition of the subject as being referable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicable of the class. The three 'signs' belong to the three arguments 'à priori,' 'à posteriori,' and 'from analogy.']

b. He [now] defines the 'recognition of likeness.'‡

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* अनुमानं लक्षयति विभजतेच ॥

† तत्पूर्व्वकं प्रत्यक्षपूर्व्वकम् ॥

‡ प्रसिद्धस्य पूर्व्वप्रमितस्य गवादेः साधर्म्म्यात् साद्दश्यात् तज्ज्ञानात् साध्यस्य गवयादिपदवाच्यत्वस्य साधनं सिद्धिरुपमानम् ॥

What is meant by the recognition of likeness.

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् ॥ ६ ॥

No. 6.—The 'recognition of likeness' is the instrument [in the ascertaining] of that which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something [previously] well-known.

a. [That is to say] the 'recognition of likeness' is the instrument [in the ascertaining]—or [—for the Sanskrit term, not strictly defined, stands for either—] it is the ascertainment itself of the signification, which we wish to determine, of a word, such as *gavaya* for example—through the perception of likeness or similarity to something perfectly well known, i. e. of which we have previously obtained a right notion,—as a *cow* for example.

b. [A man is told that the *gavaya*, or 'bos gavaeus,' is an animal like a cow. Going to the forest, he sees an animal like a cow. By means of the instrumental knowledge above described, he arrives at the conviction that '*this* thing is what is meant by the word *gavaya*.']

c. [The term 'recognition of likeness'—*upamána*—is to be employed throughout to denote the *instrument*; and the commentator notices two etymological views, either of which will justify that employment:—thus] it may denote the instrument, if we suppose an ellipsis, and that it stands for 'that *from which* the recognition of likeness' is obtained; or it will be the name of the instrument, if we suppose the word to be formed by the affix of instrumentality—viz. *lyuṭ* [—Páṇini, III. 3, 117—*] which marks the instrument of something to be established or effected.†

What is meant by a 'word.'

d. [Now] he defines a 'word.'‡

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ ७ ॥

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* करणाधिकरणयोश्च॥ अष्ट० ॥

† उपमितिर्यत इत्यध्याहारेण च करणलक्षणं। अथवा साध्यसाधनमिति करणल्युटा करणलक्षणमेवेदम् ॥

‡ शब्दं लक्षयति ॥

No. 7.—A 'word' [κατ' ἐξοχην] is the precept [or instructive assertion] of one worthy [to have his words implicitly accepted as an authority.]

a. By saying 'A word'—he mentions what is to be defined. It means [—as used here by Gautama—not a mere sound, &c. but] a word which is an *instrument of right notion.* 'The precept of one worthy'—such is the definition.*

b. Or the expression given as the definition may mean 'a right [or fitting] precept [or instructive assertion;]'—that from which [correct] knowledge 'verbally communicated' (*śábda*) arises.†

c. He now divides this :—

स द्विविधो दृष्टादृष्टार्थत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

No. 8.—It is of two kinds, in respect that it may be that 'whereof the matter is seen,' or that 'whereof the matter is unseen.'

a. 'It'—i. e. a word that is an instrument of right notion.‡

b. By 'that whereof the matter is seen' he means that [word] the thing declared by which is accessible to instruments of knowledge other than words themselves or any instrument [—such as that spoken of under §6, *a.*—] dependent thereon§ [—i. e. dependent on words.]

c. By 'that whereof the matter is unseen' he means that [word]

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* शब्द इति लक्ष्यकथनं। तदर्थः प्रमाणशब्द इति। आप्तोपदेश इति लक्षणम् ॥

† अथवा। आप्तो यथार्थ उपदेशः। शाब्दबोधो यस्मात्तत् ॥

‡ स प्रमाणशब्दः ॥

§ शब्दतदुपजीविप्रमाणातिरिक्तप्रमाणगम्यार्थको दृष्टार्थकः ॥

the thing declared by which is accessible *only* to words or to instruments of investigation dependent thereon.*

d. And thus, through the distinction of 'the being that whereof the matter is seen' and 'the being that whereof the matter is unseen,' there is a twofold character of words that are instruments of right notion—such is the meaning† [which may be put into plain English thus;—Assertions are of two kinds—capable of verification, and incapable of verification.]

e. Here the topic of the definition of the instruments of right notion is concluded.‡

f. He next divides and defines the objects which are fitted to supply right notions.§

SECTION III.

THE OBJECTS ABOUT WHICH THE ENQUIRY IS CONCERNED.

What things furnish the objects of right notion.

आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमन: प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्य भावफलदु:खापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् ॥ ९ ॥

No. 9.—But soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude, are what are fitted to supply right notions.

a. [And it is not to be objected that this enumeration is not exhaustive]—for the expression 'fitted to supply right notions,'

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* शब्दतदुपजीविप्रमाणमात्रगम्यार्थको ऽदृष्टार्थक: ॥

† तथाच दृष्टार्थकत्वादृष्टार्थकत्वभेदात्प्रमाणशब्दस्य द्वैविध्यमित्यर्थ:॥

‡ समाप्तं प्रमाणलक्षणप्रकरणम् ॥

§ प्रमेयं विभजते लक्षयतिच ॥

—like the word 'disquisition' or the like, [see §1—which is employed in this work with a sense technically limited—] is specially appropriated, as a kind of technical term, to these twelve* [things enumerated in the aphorism.]

b. Among these [twelve things enumerated in the aphorism,] having named,—as these take the precedence,—the set of six which are in the shape of *causes;* the set of six, 'fitted to supply right notion,' which are in the shape of *effects,* are mentioned [after these.] On this point [—viz. the order of arrangement to be observed in enunciation—] they tell us that "the enunciation first of each one foremost [in respect of those that follow it] is regulated by its superior dignity† [in comparison with those that follow it."]

c. Among these [enounced in §9] he defines the one first enounced—viz. Soul.

Soul defined. इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् ॥ १० ॥

No. 10.—Desire, Aversion, Volition *(prayatna),* Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge, are the sign of the Soul.

a. Here [—some one may object—] your saying the 'sign' *(linga)* is incongruous, because the soul [is not *inferred* by means of a 'sign'—but] is intuitively recognised.‡ [This objection would be a sound one if the word 'sign' *were* here employed in its technical sense, of τεκμηριον,—the 'reason' in a syllogism;—

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* प्रमेयशब्दो हि वादादिशब्दवत् परिभाषाविशेषेण द्वादशसु प्रवर्त्तते ॥

† अत्र प्राधान्यात्कारणरूपषट्कमभिधाय कार्य्यरूपप्रमेयषट्कमभिहितं। तत्र पूर्व्वपूर्व्वस्य प्राधान्यात् प्रथममुद्देश इति वदन्ति ॥

‡ अत्रचात्मनः प्रत्यक्षत्वाल्लिङ्गकथनमसङ्गतम् ॥

but it is not so]—for the word 'sign' *(linga)* here means [nothing more than] a 'characteristic'* *(lakshaṇa.)*

b. He next defines 'body' [—the topic, among those enunciated in §9—] which presents itself next in order.†

Body defined. चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् ॥ ११ ॥

No. 11.—The body is the site of [muscular] action *(cheshṭá)*, of the organs of sensation *(indriya)*, and of the sentiments [of pain or pleasure experienced by the soul.]

a. And the nature of the [muscular] action (*cheshṭá*) is this—that it is a peculiar species [of action] the constitutive peculiarity of which is its being the result of volition *(prayatna)*.‡

b. The word *artha* [which has been rendered by 'sentiment'] in the expression "the site of the sentiments of pain or pleasure," is not intended [—as it is in §9—] to denote *colours* and the like [objects of sense], for then the fact of being the site *thereof* [—instead of its being what we intend to speak of—viz. a distinctive characteristic of the body—] would extend, beyond where it ought, to *jars*, &c.;—but it is intended to denote pleasure or pain alternatively. Therefore the *Bháshya* [or commentary by *Vátsyáyana*] tells us "In what tabernacle there prevails the consciousness of pleasure and of pain, that is [what we mean by] the *site* of these—and *that* is the body."§

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* लिङ्गपदस्य लक्षणार्थत्वात् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं शरीरं लक्षयति ॥

‡ चेष्टात्वञ्च प्रयत्नजन्यतावच्छेदको जातिविशेषः ॥

§ अर्थाश्रयत्वमित्यत्रार्थशब्दो न रूपादिपरस्तदाश्रयत्वस्य घटादावतिव्याप्तेः किन्तु सुखदुःखान्यतरपरः। अत एव भाष्यं। यस्मिन्नायतने सुखदुःखयोः प्रतिसंवेदनं प्रवर्त्तते स एषामाश्रयस्तच्छरीरमिति ॥

c. He divides and defines the organs of sensation *(indriya)*.*

What are the organs of sense.

घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः ॥१२॥

No. 12.—The organs of sensation [originating, or not differing,] from the Elements [§13], are Smell, Taste, Sight, Touch, and Hearing.

a. Although the *Mind* also certainly is [as declared by the Sánkhyas—see *Tattwa-samása* §29—] an 'organ' *(indriya)*, yet, since we employ the term not as being *exclusively* applicable to the Smell, &c., there is no fault [to be found with our employment of the term.] But, in reality, by 'organs' [in this place] we mean [exclusively] the *external* organs; and hence there is no incongruousness in [the addition of] the expression "from the Elements,"† [—which *would* be incongruous if we intended to include *Mind*].

b. Do the Smell, &c., originate [as held by the Sánkhyas—see *Tattwa-samása* §26 and §27—] from one of the 'producers'? As there may be an expectation [that this question should be resolved,] he says—"from the *Elements*." Hence it is *not* to be held that the organs of sensation originate in that productive agency termed 'self-consciousness' [—see *Tattwa-samása* §54—]. And this will be explained in the 3rd Lecture.‡

c. What are the Elements? As there will naturally be an expectation [that he should explain what he means by the expres-

* इन्द्रियं विभजते लक्षयतिच ॥

† यद्यपि मनसोऽपीन्द्रियत्वमस्त्येव तथापि घ्राणेत्यादेरुपलक्षणपरत्वान्न दोषः। वस्तुतस्त्विन्द्रियाणीत्यस्य बहिरिन्द्रियाणीत्यर्थः। तेन भूतेभ्य इत्यस्य नासङ्गतिः॥

‡ घ्राणादीनि किं प्रकृतिकानीत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह भूतेभ्य इति। तेनेन्द्रियाणामहङ्कारप्रकृतिकत्वं नेति मन्तव्यं।

sion in question—employed as it is in the definition laid down in the aphorism §12,—therefore] he says—*

What are the Elements.

पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुराकाशमिति भूतानि ॥ १३ ॥

No. 13.—Earth, Water, Light *(tejas)*, Air, Ether,—these are the Elements *(bhúta)*.

a. He next divides and defines 'sense-object' [—the topic, among those enunciated in §9,—] which presents itself next in order.†

What are the objects of the senses.

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुणास्तदर्थाः ॥ १४ ॥

No. 14.—Their 'objects' *(artha)* are the qualities of Earth, &c. [see §13,] viz., odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound.

a. By the word 'their,' the external organs of sensation [§12,] are referred to.‡

b. To define 'understanding' *(buddhi)*, he says—§

Understanding or knowledge.

बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥ १५ ॥

No. 15.—Understanding *(buddhi)*, apprehension *(upalabdhi)*, knowledge *(jnána)*—these are not different in meaning.

a. 'Not different in meaning'—i. e. synonymous.‖

b. He next defines the Mind—¶

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* भूतान्येव कानीत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तमर्थं विभजते लक्षयतिच ॥

‡ तच्छब्देन बहिरिन्द्रियाणि परामृश्यन्ते ॥

§ बुद्धिं लक्षयितुमाह ॥

‖ अनर्थान्तरं समानार्थकम् ॥

¶ मनो लक्षयति ॥

What is the Mind.

युगपत्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ॥ १६ ॥

No. 16.—The sign [—conf. §10, *a.*—] of the Mind *(manas)* is [that habit in virtue of which] it does not give rise simultaneously to notions [more than one].

a. 'Simultaneously'—i. e. at one time. [Of course] you must supply "in a single *soul*"* [—if you speak of the mind generically, and not of an individual mind].

b. The meaning [of the aphorism] is—that the sign—meaning the *characteristic*—of Mind is that property, viz., the *atomic* nature of the intellectual organ, from which it happens that there do not arise notions† [more than one at once in one and the same soul].

c. He next defines and divides Activity‡ *(pravritti)*.

प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः ॥ १७ ॥

Energy defined.

No. 17.—Activity is that which originates the [utterances of the] voice *(vák)*, the [cognitions of the] understanding, and the [gestures of the] body.

a. Since the expression 'which originates,'—heard [in the aphorism] immediately after the Dwandwa compound,—is in construction with each term severally [in the compound], Activity is of three descriptions, according to the division into 'that originating the [utterances of the] voice,' &c.§

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* युगपत्। एककाले। एकात्मनीति पूरणीयम्॥

† ज्ञानानामनुत्पत्तिर्यतः स एव धर्मो ज्ञानकरणाणुत्वं मनसो लिङ्गं लक्षणमित्यर्थः॥

‡ प्रवृत्तिं लक्षयति विभजतेच॥

§ द्वन्द्वानन्तरश्रुतारम्भपदस्य प्रत्येकमन्वयाद्वाग्रारम्भादिभेदेन त्रिविधा प्रवृत्तिः॥

b. By the word 'understanding' *(buddhi)* here, the Mind *(manas)* is meant;—and the word 'body' *(śarîra)* is common to the *hands* and other members [as indicative of each and all of these] in so far as these have the power of muscular action* [—see §11, *a.*].

c. Thus [—to explain—] an effort tending to utterance is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the voice':—an effort the site of which is the body, or [more properly] which tends to gesture [or bodily movement] is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the [gesture of the] body';—an effort distinct from both of these is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the [cognitions of the] understanding.' And this [last one], tending to [the act of] vision, &c., is accomplished in the mere dawning of attention† [—attention alone being required in order that the revelations of the external world may flow into the understanding through the appropriate channels of the senses].

d. He now defines [the failings or weaknesses to which he gives the name of] Fault *(dosha)*.‡

प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा दोषाः ॥ १८ ॥

The passions what.

No. 18.—Faults [or failings] have the characteristic that they cause Activity.

a. The employment of the plural, in the expression 'Faults,' is intended to make one aware of [not a single species, but of] a

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* बुद्धिशब्देनात्र मन उभिप्रेतोमिति। शरीरशब्दश्च चेष्टावत्त्वेन हस्तादिसाधारणः ॥

† तथा वचनानुकूलयत्नो वागारम्भः। शरीरगोचरो यत्नश्चेष्टानुकूलयत्नो वा शरीरारम्भः। एतद्व्यभिन्नो यत्नो बुद्ध्यारम्भः। स च ध्यानोदयादेव दर्शनाद्यनुकूलः पर्य्यवस्यति ॥

‡ दोषं लक्षयति ॥

triad of things to be defined [as faults or failings]—in the shape of Affection *(rága)*, Aversion *(dwesha)*, and Stolidity *(moha)**—[each of which is regarded as a fault or defect, inasmuch as—see §20—it leads to actions, the recompense of which, whether good or evil, must be received in some birth or state of mundane existence—to the postponement of the great end of entire emancipation—see §2].

b. The word *pravarttaná* means the being a producer of Activity. Those of which just this is the characteristic† [are what we mean by Faults].

c. He now defines [our mortal life or the state of] transmigration‡ *(pretyabháva)*.

पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः ॥ १९ ॥

Mortal life. No. 19.—Transmigration means the being produced again [and again].

a. The word *pretyabháva* is formed out of *pretya* 'having died' and *bháva* 'the becoming [born into the world again']. As, by the expression "again," here habitualness is meant to be implied—there is first a birth, then death, then a birth—thus [the state of] transmigration, commencing with [one's first] birth,

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* दोषा इति बज्रवचनं रागद्वेषमोहात्मकलक्ष्यत्रयज्ञापनाय ॥

† प्रवर्त्तना प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वं। तदेव लक्षणं येषाम् ॥

Mr. Colebrooke appears to have viewed the term here rendered 'the being a *producer* of Activity' as signifying 'the being a *product* of Activity,'—for, with reference to this, GAUTAMA's definition of 'fault' *(dosha)*, he says (—see Essays, vol. I. p. 289.—) "From acts proceed faults *(dosha)*: including under this designation, passion," &c. The word 'fault' *(dosha)*, as technically employed by GAUTAMA in the sense assigned to it in §18. *a.*, is not to be confounded with *adharmma* 'demerit' which latter *does* proceed from acts. See further in our note on §2. *d.*

‡ प्रेत्यभावं लक्षयति ॥

ends [only] with [final] emancipation. And this knowledge is conducive to the 'relinquishment of all passions' *(vairágya)*,—therefore it was not needless [—as some persons may think, on reading the aphorism and reflecting that the condition called *pretyabháva* is just the condition of us men, and might as well have been called *bháva* 'condition' simply;—it was not needless, we say,] to add the word *pretya* 'having died'* [—a word suggestive of the fleeting character of this mortal life, and which, combined with the word *bháva*, 'state,' gives the compound term *pretyabháva* to denote our mundane existence].

b. He next defines Fruits *(phala)*†—

प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितार्थः फलम् ॥ २० ॥

Retribution. No. 20.—Fruit is that thing which is produced by Activity and by [the originaters of Activity—viz. our constitutional faults or] Failings—[see §18].

a. And amongst these [fruits] the fruit that is denoted by the word primarily is the fruition of pleasure or of pain; and so the *Bháshya* tells us "Fruit is the consciousness of pleasure or of pain." And since one's [unwise] Activity in engaging either in duties or offences is the causer thereof, and the *Failing* again [—whether of passion or mere folly—see §18—] is the cause of *that*, therefore he says "produced by Activity and by [the origi-

* प्रेत्य मृत्वा भावो जननं प्रेत्यभावः। तत्र पुनरित्यनेनाभ्यासकथनात् प्रागुत्पत्तिस्ततो मरणं तत उत्पत्तिरिति प्रेत्यभावो जनमादिरपवर्गान्तः। एतत् ज्ञानञ्च वैराग्य उपयुज्यत इति प्रेत्येति न व्यर्थम् ॥

Hence Mr. Colebrooke's definition of *pretyabháva* as "the condition of the soul after death" (—see Essays, vol. I. p. 290—) while it is literally correct, may mislead the reader if he does not bear it in mind that this, according to Hindú notions, is the condition of every man *now alive*—for, as we are all supposed to have lived and died no one knows how often, we are each of us always in the condition "*after death*."

† फलं लक्षयति ॥

naters of Activity—viz. our] Failings." But the definition, [—if we regard the nature instead of the origin of Fruits] is 'the experiencing of pleasure or pain—one or other.' But by 'fruit' in a *secondary* application of the term, we mean every thing [mundane] beginning with the body.*

b. He next defines Pain *(du'kha)*†—

बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् ॥ २१ ॥

Pain defined. No. 21.—Pain is that which is in the shape of Vexation.

a. The word 'pain,' in the 'secondary application'‡ of the term, is employed to denote the body, the senses, and their objects, since these are the instruments of pain, and to denote *pleasure*, because of its being ever closely connected with pain. And only therefore [i. e. since the one term 'pain' implies the *whole* of these] is 'pain' referred to, in the aphorism following, by the term 'that.'§

b. He now defines emancipation‖ *(apavarga)*.

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* अत्रच मुख्यं फलं सुखदुःखोपभोगः । तथाच भाष्यं । सुखदुःखसंवेदनं फलं । तत्रच धर्म्माधर्म्मापेक्षेः प्रयोजकत्वात्तत्रच दोषस्य हेतुत्वात् प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितेत्युक्तं । लक्षणन्तु सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कार इति । गौणं फलन्तु शरीरादिकं सर्व्वमेव ॥

† दुःखं लक्षयति ॥

‡This is what is to be understood by the varieties of evil which Mr. Colebrooke (Essays vol. 1. p. 290) mentions as "primary or secondary." It is not *degrees* of evil that are to be understood as thus referred to; but, the author, we are told, chooses to employ the word 'pain' *technically*—in a 'transferred sense'—to denote the *causes* of pain also, as well as pain itself.

§ शरीरेन्द्रियार्थेषु दुःखसाधनत्वात्सुखेच दुःखानुषङ्गात् दुःखव्यवहारो गौण इति । अत एवाग्रिमसूत्रे तत्पदेन दुःखपरामर्शः ॥

‖ अपवर्गं लक्षयति ॥

तदत्यन्तविमोक्षो ऽपवर्गः ॥ २२ ॥

Beatitude what. No. 22.—Absolute deliverance from that is Emancipation.

a. 'That'—i. e. pain [—as understood in its widest acceptation—see §21. *a.*]

b. 'Absolute deliverance'—i. e. the annihilation of the pain which has the same locus as one's self, [i. e. one's *own* pain], and [an annihilation thereof] not synchronous [with the pain that belongs to each moment of our mundane state;—for each moment, as it passess, sees the extinction of its own quantum of pain; but what is so "devoutly to be wished" is the absolute annihilation of one's troubles once for all].*

c. Here is completed the topic of the Definition of the things that furnish the objects of right notion† [§9].

d. He now defines 'doubt' *(sanśaya)* which presents itself next in order‡ [in the list given in §1].

SECTION IV.

COMPLETING THE TOPIC OF THE PRE-REQUISITES OF REASONING.

समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः ॥ २३ ॥

Doubt defined. No. 23.—Doubt is a conflicting judgment [in regard to one and the same object] respecting its distinction [or precise character;—this conflicting judgment arising] from unsteadiness in the recognition [of some mark which, if we could

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* अत्यन्तविमोक्षः स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखासमानकालीनो ध्वंसः ॥

† समानं प्रमेयलक्षणप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं संशयं लक्षयति ॥

make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so] or [from unsteadiness] in the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be *not* so and so;—this state of things, moreover, resulting] from the recognition [in the object] of [only such] properties [as are] common [to a variety of things, and therefore not distinctive,] or of several properties [such as cannot really belong to one and the same thing,] or from conflicting testimony.

a. "Doubt:"—here is the statement of what is to be defined.*

b. "A conflicting judgment"—*(vimarsha)*:—here the prefix *vi* signifies 'confliction,' and the root *mriś* signifies 'knowing.' "In regard to a single object"—is to be supplied. So that Doubt means, in regard to any single object, Knowledge distinguished, contradictoriwise, by the [simultaneous] presence and the absence† [of some given nature].

c. [The commentators are not unanimous in their interpretation of this aphorism, some holding that there are five kinds of doubt referred to, and others that there are only three. We have preferred the latter view. Of the first kind of doubt an example is furnished by the case of an object, in the twilight, of which we can discern nothing more than that its size is that of a man,—a property which may belong to a post as well as to a man.‡ We have an example of the second kind in the dubious and disputed question whether Sound is a substance or a quality or an action.§ It cannot be more than one of these, yet it presents

* संशय इति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः ॥

† विमर्श इत्यत्र विशब्दो विरोधार्थः। मृशिर्ज्ञानार्थः। एकस्मिन् धर्म्मिणीति पूरणीयं। तेन। एकधर्म्मिणी विरोधेन भावाभावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संशयः ॥

‡ स्थानुर्वा पुरुषो वा ॥

§ शब्दो द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म्म वेति ॥

characters which furnish plausible grounds for contending that it is each of the three. The third kind of doubt is, of course, such as arises when, of two witnesses (presumed equally trust-worthy) the one asserts what the other denies.]

d. He now defines [the fourth in the list §1—viz.] 'Motive' *(prayojana)*, which next presents itself.*

यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्त्तते तत्प्रयोजनम् ॥ २४ ॥

No. 24.—What thing having set before one, one proceeds to act—*that* [thing] is the 'Motive' [of the action.]

a. 'Having set before one,'—i. e. having proposed [to one's self—as something to be gained or avoided.] And so what constitutes any thing a Motive is its being the object of desire, which [desire either of attaining or escaping] is the cause of one's acting.†

b. He now defines [the fifth in the list §1.—viz.] 'familiar case of a fact' *(drishṭánta)* which next presents itself.‡

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः ॥ २५ ॥

No. 25.—In regard to [some fact respecting] what thing both the ordinary man and the acute investigator entertain a sameness of opinion, that [thing] is called a 'familiar case' [of the fact in question.]

a. The 'Ordinary man,'—i. e. one to be informed—who has *not* attained that superiority of intellect which is the result of conversancy with books;—such is the sense of the term [—among the

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* क्रमप्राप्तं प्रयोजनं लक्षयति ॥

† अधिकृत्य उद्दिश्य। तथाच प्रवृत्तिहेत्विच्छाविषयत्वं प्रयोजनत्वम्।

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं दृष्टान्तं लक्षयति ॥

various senses that might be given to it—] that will be found of use.*

b. The 'acute investigator'—i. e. the informer [of the ordinary man §25. *a.*]—one who *has* attained superiority of intellect through conversancy with books;—such is the sense of the term that will be found of use.†

c. Here closes the topic of the pre-requisites of Reasoning.‡

d. He now defines [the sixth in the list §1—viz.] 'Tenet' *(siddhánta)*, which next presents itself.§

SECTION V.

Of positions, not familiar, that may be employed in reasoning without requiring to be each time demonstrated.

तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितिःसिद्धान्तः ॥ २६ ॥

No. 26.—A 'Tenet' *(siddhánta)* is that, the steadfastness of the acceptance of which rests on a treatise [of weight and authority.]

a. He next divides‖ [the 'tenets' thus characterised generally.]

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* लौकिको ऽप्राप्तशास्त्रपरिशीलनजन्यबुद्धिप्रकर्षः प्रतिपाद्य इति फलितार्थः ॥

† परीक्षकः शास्त्रपरिशीलनप्राप्तबुद्धिप्रकर्षः प्रतिपादक इति फलितार्थः ॥

‡ समाप्तं न्यायपूर्व्वाङ्गप्रकरणम् ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्तं सिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

‖ विभजते ॥

सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितीनामर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ २७ ॥

No. 27.—['Tenets' are divided into the species that are described in the succeeding aphorisms] through the difference between a 'Dogma of all the schools,' a 'Dogma peculiar to some school,' a 'Hypothetical Dogma,' and a 'Dogmatic corollary.'

a. It is of four kinds—such is the remainder [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism]. The meaning is this that it is so through the difference of its owing its steadfastness to *all* the schools [or to only one,] &c.*

b. He now defines a 'Dogma of all the schools' *(sarvvatantra-siddhánta.)*†

सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धस्तन्त्रेऽधिकृतः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः ॥ २८ ॥

No. 28.—That [position or tenet] which is not in opposition to any of the schools, and which is claimed [as a tenet] by [at least] some one school, is [what we mean by] a 'Dogma of all the schools.'

a. He next defines a 'Dogma peculiar to some school' *(pratitantra-siddhánta.)*‡

समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परतन्त्रसिद्धः प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः ॥ २९ ॥

No. 29.—That [position] which is [held] established in the same school, and which in another school is [regarded as] not established, is [what we mean by] a 'Dogma peculiar to some school.'

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* स चतुर्विध इति शेषः। सर्वतन्त्रादिसंस्थितीनामर्थान्तरभावात्। भेदादित्यर्थः ॥

† सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

‡ प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

a. The word 'same' [in the expression 'established in the same school'] means 'one.' So the sense is 'established in *one* school.' The complete sense is 'established in its *own* school.' So the sense in which we shall find it useful to employ the term [—since, in a controversy, we may imagine each school to be represented by a single partisan—] is this, that whatever is assented to by only one or other of two disputants is the peculiar dogma of that one of the two,—as, for example, the eternity of sound is [a peculiar dogma] of the followers of the Mímánsá school.*

b. [Thus the *pratitantra-siddhánta* is what supplies the material for the *argumentum ad hominem* in the disputations of the schools.]

c. He next defines a 'Hypothetical Dogma' *(adhikaraṇa-siddhánta.)*†

यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिः सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः ॥ ३० ॥

No. 30.—That, if which be [held] established, there is the establishing of another point, is [what we mean by] a 'Hypothetical Dogma.'

a. The meaning is this—that, that position [—for which no evidence is offered in the first instance—] is a hypothetical dogma [or a hypothesis] only on the establishment of which taking place [—by being conceded—] does the establishment take place of another proposition under consideration.‡

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* समानशब्द एकार्थस्तनैकतन्त्रसिद्ध इत्यर्थः। स्वतन्त्रसिद्ध इति पर्य्यवसितोऽर्थः। तथा वादिप्रतिवाद्येकतरमात्राभ्युपगतस्तदेकतरस्य प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त इति फलितार्थः। यथा मीमांसकानां शब्दनित्यत्वम् ॥

† अधिकरणसिद्धान्तं लक्षयति ॥

‡ यस्यार्थस्य सिद्धौ जायमानायामेवान्यस्य प्रकरणस्य प्रस्तुतस्य सिद्धिर्भवति सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्त इत्यर्थः ॥

b. He next defines a 'Dogmatic corollary.'

अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः ॥ ३१ ॥

No. 31.—A 'Dogmatic corollary' is the mention of a particular fact in regard to any thing, not expressly declared in an aphorism, [our knowledge of the fact coming so immediately] from what *is* recognised, [by the maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous—the fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogma.]

a. "Not expressly declared in an aphorism"—such is here the meaning of the term *aparíkshita.**

b. "The mention of a particular fact"—such is here the meaning of the expression *viśesha-parikshaṇa.*†

c. And thus a 'Dogmatic corollary' [or an implied dogma] is what is received as a tenet [or first principle] without being expressly laid down in an aphorism,—as, for example, [the tenet] that the Mind is an organ‡ [of the Soul,—which is recognised as one of the tenets of the Nyáya, although nowhere expressly asserted by GAUTAMA.]

Here ends the topic of the definition of the scholastic tenets that take their place in argumentation.§

He next divides, with a view to defining, the members [of a demonstration] which present themselves next in order‖ [among the topics—see §1—].

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* अपरीक्षितस्य साक्षादसूचितस्य ॥

† विशेषपरीक्षणं विशेषधर्म्मकथनम् ॥

‡ तथाच साक्षादसूचिताभ्युपगमोऽभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः । यथा मनस इन्द्रियत्वमिति ॥

§ समाप्तं न्यायाश्रयसिद्धान्तलक्षणप्रकरणम् ॥

‖ क्रमप्राप्तानवयवांल्लक्षयितुं विभजते ॥

SECTION VI.

THE METHOD OF ARGUMENTATIVE EXPOSITION.

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः ॥ ३२ ॥

No. 32.—The members [of a demonstration] are (1) the Proposition, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, (4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion.

a. He defines the Proposition* [to be proved.]

साध्यनिर्द्देशः प्रतिज्ञा ॥ ३३ ॥

No. 33.—The Proposition is the declaration of what is to be established.

a. Of what is to be established—the declaration—*this* is the Proposition:—and "what is to be established" is this, that such a thing as a hill is possessed, for instance, of *fire*.†

b. He defines, and [illegible], by two subsequent Aphorisms divides, the Reason, which presents itself next in order‡ [—of those enumerated in § 32].

उदाहरणसाधर्म्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं हेतुः तथा वैधर्म्म्यात् ॥ ३४ ॥

No. 34.—The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established; [and this it is], through the Example's having the nature, or in like manner through its [illegible] nature, [implied in the Reason,—in other words—

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* प्रतिज्ञां लक्षयति ॥

† साधनीयस्यार्थस्य यो निर्द्देशः स प्रतिज्ञा। साधनीयश्च वह्निमत्त्वादिना पर्वतादिः ॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं हेतुं लक्षयति विभजतेच सूत्राभ्याम् ॥

through the Reason's being distributed, affirmatively or negatively, in the Major Premiss].

a. Here the generic definition is this—that "The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established." By "the means for [the establishing of] what is to be established," is meant [not exclusively the assigned Reason itself but] that [second member out of the five—see §32—] which informs us [by its use of the 5th case-affix] that such and such has the power of giving information leading to the establishing of what is to be established.* [For example, when we say, 'The hill is fiery—because there is smoke',—the 'smoke' is the Reason of our knowing that the hill is fiery, but the whole clause 'because there is smoke' is also technically called the Reason].

b. He declares that it is of two sorts when he says "through the example's having the nature, or in like manner through its having the reverse of the nature [implied in the Reason]." By the possession of the same nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] 'agreement' *(anwaya)*, and by the possession of the reverse of the nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] 'contrariety' *(vyatireka)*. The meaning that will prove serviceable [when we speak of this agreement and contrariety] is that of 'invariable attendedness' *(vyápti)* of the one or the other description.† [Thus when we speak of the 'agreement' of *fire* with *smoke*—the smoke being adduced as the Reason for holding that there is fire, we mean to speak of the invariableness of smoke's being attended by fire; and when we speak of the contrariety of *fire* and a *lake*—the lake being adduced as the Reason for holding that the vapour rising from the place is *not* smoke, we

* अत्र साध्यसाधनं हेतुरिति सामान्यलक्षणं। साध्यसाधनं साध्यसिद्ध्यनुकूलज्ञापकत्वबोधकं इत्यर्थः॥

† तस्य वैधर्म्म्यमाह। उदाहरणसाधर्म्म्यात्तथा वैधर्म्म्यादिति। साधर्म्म्यमन्वयः। वैधर्म्म्यं व्यतिरेकः। तादृशव्याप्तिरिति फलितार्थः।

mean to speak of the invariableness of a lake's being *devoid* of fire.]

c. He now defines the Example, which presents itself next in order* [—of those enumerated in §32—].

सध्युसाधर्म्यात्तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम् ॥ ३५ ॥

No. 35.—The Example is some 'familiar case of the fact'—[see §25—], which, through the [suggestion of the reason's] invariable attendedness by what is to be established, causes that nature [or property] to be [admitted to belong to the subject] which is to be established [as belonging to the subject].

a. The definition [—expressed generally—] is this—viz. "The Example is some familiar case of the fact." Here the [elliptical] expression 'familiar case of the fact' means that Member [of the five-membered exposition—see §32—] which is appropriated to the *mention* of the familiar case of the fact:—hence there is no harm if, seeing that some familiar case of a fact is only temporarily so [—i. e. employed as an Example—], it is not invariably so† [—the terms not being co-extensive in their application, for a fact remains a fact even when not cited as an Example—].

b. [But the Example is of two kinds—see §34 *b.*—so,] to complete this [definition in §35] we must add that it is the Example where we have a case of invariable attendedness* [that we are here speaking of].

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* क्रमप्राप्तमुदाहरणं लक्षयति ॥

† दृष्टान्त उदाहरणमिति लक्षणं। दृष्टान्तवचनं दृष्टान्तकथनयोग्यावयव इत्यर्थः। तेन दृष्टान्तस्य सामयिकत्वेनासार्व्वत्रिकत्वे ऽपि न क्षतिः ॥

‡ अन्वय्युदाहरणमिति शेषः ॥

c. He next defines the Example where we have a case of invariable abandonedness.*

तद्विपर्य्ययाद्वा विपरीतं व्यतिरेक्युदाहरणम् ॥ ३६ ॥

No. 36.—Or inversely [—as regards the 'invariable attendedness' spoken of in §35—] the Example, on the contrary, may be one where we have a case of invariable abandonedness.

a. [As when we argue, see §34, *b*.—that the vapour seen rising from a lake is *not* smoke, because a lake is invariably devoid of fire.]

b. He next defines the Application, which presents itself next in order† [—of those enumerated in §32—.]

उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्योपनयः ॥ ३७ ॥

No. 37.—The Application is the collecting [or bringing under simultaneous view] with respect to the Example, what is to be established as being *so*, or *not* so.

a. And the Application is of two kinds, through the distinction of (1) that where we have [in the Example—] a case of invariable attendedness, and (2) that where we have a case of invariable abandonedness. "So" [—or "in like manner"—] such is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable attendedness. "Not so" is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable abandonedness.‡ [In other words—'and so is this" *(tathá-cháyam)* is the form of expression when

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* व्यतिरेक्युदाहरणं लक्षयति ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तमुपनयं लक्षयति ॥

‡ सचोपनयो द्विविधोऽन्वयिव्यतिरेकिभेदात्। तथेति साध्यस्योपसंहारोऽन्वय्युपनयः। न तथेति साध्यस्योपसंहारो व्यतिरेक्युपनयः।

the Minor Premiss is affirmative; while "and not so is this" *(na-cháyan tathá)* is the form of expression when the Minor Premiss is negative.]

The conclusion defined.

b. He next defines the conclusion.*

हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम् ॥ ३८ ॥

No. 38.—The conclusion is the re-stating of the Proposition because of the mention of the Reason [which now authorizes us to prefix the illative 'Therefore'].

a. Here concludes the topic of the form of demonstration.†

b. He now defines Confutation, which presents itself next in order.‡

SECTION VII.

Concluding the topic of demonstration.

अविज्ञाततत्त्वे ऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमूहस्तर्कः ॥ ३९ ॥

Confutation, or reductio ad absurdum.

No. 39.—Confutation—[which is intended] for the assertaining of the truth in regard to a question, the truth in regard to which is not accurately apprehended—is reasoning from the supposition of [the cessation of] the cause [to the cessation of the effect—for, on the admitted cessation of the cause, the observed resulting phenomenon ought of course to cease also].

a. [In other words, confutation consists in our directing a person, who does not apprehend the force of the argument as first

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* निगमनं लक्षयति ॥

† समाप्तं न्यायस्वरूपप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ क्रमप्राप्तं तर्कं लक्षयति ॥

presented to him, to look at it from an opposite point of view. For example—to take a simple case, which, simple as it is, correctly represents the generic form to which all the logical errors of man are reducible—suppose a person admits that there is smoke in the hill, but denies that there is fire,—having previously granted that where there is smoke there is fire, we confute him—and put him in the way of coming to a 'right notion'—by remarking of the hill that] if it were without fire, it would be without smoke.*

b. He now defines Ascertainment, which presents itself next in order.†

विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णयः ॥ ४० ॥

Certainty arrived at by hearing both sides.

No. 40.—Ascertainment is the determination of a question by [hearing] both what is to be said for and against it, after having been in doubt.

a. Here closes the topic [—see § 25. *c.*—] of the latter division of Reasoning.‡

b. So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture of the commentary composed on the Aphorisms of the Nyáya, by the venerable VIŚWANÁTHA BHAṬṬÁCHÁRYYA.§

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* निर्वह्निः स्यान्निर्धूमः स्यादिति ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं निर्णयं लक्षयति ॥

‡ समाप्तं न्यायोत्तरराङ्गप्रकरणम् ॥

§ इति श्री विश्वनाथभट्टाचार्य्यकृतायां न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION VIII.

THE TOPIC OF CONTROVERSY.

c. He now defines Discussion.*

Definition of a fair discussion.

प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नपक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः ॥ ४१ ॥

No. 41. Discussion is the undertaking [—by two parties respectively—] of the one side and the other in regard to what [conclusion] has been arrived at by means of the five-membered [process of demonstration already explained—see §32—; this procedure] consisting in the defending [of the proposition] by proofs [on the part of the one disputant] and the assailing it by objections [on the part of the other,—the discussion being conducted on both sides] without discordance in respect of the tenets [or principles on which the conclusion is to depend].

a. [Such is the discussion that takes place between a preceptor and his pupil, when the latter brings forward objections, which the other, having a clearer view of the matter, is able to remove —there being no dispute between the two in regard to the *data*].

The prime requisite in an honest disputant.

b. The persons competent for [this honest style of] discussion are those who are really desirous to get at the truth ;†—and it is not necessary that there should be a Moderator in such a discussion, because the debate is here conducted without passion‡ [or shabby ambition of victory].

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* तत्र वादं लक्षयति ॥

† वादाधिकारिणस्तु तत्त्वबुभुत्सवः ॥

‡ साच वादे नावश्यकी वीतरागकथात्वादिति ॥

c. He defines wrangling.*

यथोक्तोपपन्नः छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपलम्भो जल्पः ॥ ४२ ॥

Definition of wrangling.

No. 42.—Wrangling, consisting in the defence or attack [of a proposition] by means of frauds [see §50], futilities [see §58], and what procedures deserve [nothing but an indignant] rebuke [see §59], is what takes place after the procedure aforesaid [—that is to say, after a fair course of argumentation,—supposing this to have failed to bring the disputants to an agreement].

The aim of the wrangler.

a. By the expression "frauds," &c. it is intimated that this kind of talk [viz. wrangling] is that of the person who is desirous of victory, for it is the man desirous of victory [instead of being desirous of truth], that makes use of frauds, &c. And so the meaning is this, that Wrangling is the discourse of him who aims only at victory, [he being quite indifferent] whether this [discourse of his] establishes either side of the question† [provided only he can make out a pretext for bragging that he has said something to the point].

b. He now defines Cavilling, which next presents itself.‡

स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा ॥ ४३ ॥

Definition of Cavilling.

No. 43.—That [—viz. Wrangling, §42,—], when devoid of [any attempt made for] the establishing of the opposite side of the question, is Cavilling.

a. [The man shabbily eager for the semblance of a victory, sometimes, see §42, *a.*, attempts to prove something by disinge-

* जल्पं लक्षयति ॥

† छलेत्यादिना विजिगीषुकथात्वं बोध्यते विजिगीषुर्हिच्छलादिकं करोति । तथाचोभयपक्षस्थापनावती विजिगीषुकथा जल्प इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ वितण्डां क्रमप्राप्तां लक्षयति ॥

nuous artifices. He is then said to wrangle. If he attempts to establish nothing, but confines himself to carping disingenuously at the arguments of the other party, he is said to cavil].

b. Here the topic of controversy is concluded.*

c. He now defines and divides the Semblances of a reason, which next present themselves.†

SECTION IX.

Of fallacies, or what only look like reasons, by means of which a man may deceive himself or another.

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमातीतकाला हेत्वाभासाः ॥ ४४ ॥

Enumeration of the Fallacies.

No. 44.—The Semblances of a reason are (1) the Erratic, (2) the Contradictory, (3) the Equally available on both sides, (4) that which is In the same case with what is to be proved, and (5) the Mistimed.

a. He now defines the Erratic‡ [semblance of a reason.]

अनैकान्तिकः सव्यभिचारः ॥ ४५ ॥

The argument that proves too much.

No. 45.—That [semblance of a reason] is Erratic which arrives at more ends than the one [required.]

a. For example [suppose one were to argue that] Sound is eternal, for it is not the object of touch§—[—the reason alleged would bring us to more conclusions than we want; because the

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* समाप्तं कथाप्रकरणम् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तान् हेत्वाभासांल्लक्षयति विभजतेच ॥

‡ सव्यभिचारं लक्षयति ॥

§ यथा शब्दो नित्यः। निःस्पर्शत्वात् ॥

quality of Conjunction or of Disjunction for example, is not the object of touch, yet no one argues for its eternity.]

b. He now defines the Contradictory [semblance of a reason] which presents itself next in order.*

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः ॥ ४६ ॥

The argument that proves the reverse.

No. 46.—That [semblance of a reason] is the Contradictory which is repugnant to what is proposed as that which is to be established.

a. 'Which is to be established,'—such is the meaning here of the term *siddhánta.*†

b. And so the meaning, as it may be most profitably regarded, is this, viz.—after having proposed, or stated, that which is to be established, [a Contradictory reason is] one employed which is opposed thereto, or invariably attended by the *negation* of what is to be established; as, for instance, [if one were to argue], 'This is fiery, because it is a body of water.'‡

c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is Equally available on both sides—this next presenting itself.§

यस्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणसमः ॥ ४७ ॥

The argument that tells equally both ways.

No. 47. That from which a question may arise as to whether the case stands this way or the other way, if employed with the view of determining the state of the case, is [a mere semblance

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* क्रमप्राप्तं विरुद्धं लक्षयति ॥

† अत्रच सिद्धान्तं साध्यम् ॥

‡ तथाच साध्यमभ्युपेत्य उद्दिश्य प्रयुक्तस्तद्विरोधी साध्याभावव्याप्त इति फलितार्थः। यथा वह्निमान् द्रवत्वादिति ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्तं प्रकरणसमं लक्षयति ॥

of a reason—being] equally available for both sides [of the dispute].

a. [According to the commentator]—That reason employed, or adduced, for the ascertainment of one's own proposition or the negation of the other's proposition, is called 'the same for both sides:'—but *which* reason?—with regard to this he says—'from which a question'; i. e. from which two opposite views may arise;—such is the account given in the *Bháshya*.*

b. [For example—suppose a man argues that Sound is eternal because it is audible, the reason here alleged will just provoke the question whether audibleness is any proof of eternity, and the opponent may with equal propriety argue that Sound, because it is audible, is *not* eternal].

c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is in the same case with what is to be proved,—this presenting itself next in order.†

साध्याविशिष्टस्य साध्यत्वात्साध्यसमः ॥ ४८ ॥

The argument that stands itself in need of proof.

No. 48.—And it [the alleged reason] is in the same case with what is to be proved, if, in standing itself in need of proof, it does not differ from that which is to be proved.

a. [As the commentator remarks]—for if the reason stands in need of being proved too, just as the proposition stands in need of being proved, then it is said to be 'in the same case with what is to be proved;' and therefore the expression 'unestablished'

* स हेतुः स्वसाध्यस्य परसाध्याभावस्य वा निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रयुक्तः प्रकरणसम उच्यते। स क इत्याकांक्षायामाह यस्मात्प्रकरणं पक्षप्रतिपक्षाविति भाष्यम् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं साध्यसमं लक्षयति ॥

(asiddha) is employed [in speaking of such a reason]; and this ['unestablishedness' or unreality] is of three sorts, through the distinction of the unreality of the locality [or subject of the alleged property], the unreality of the character [as regards the subject whereof it is assumed to be predicable], and the unreality of the universality* [assumed in the major premiss. Examples of these are given in our Lecture on the *Tarka-sangraha*].

b. He now defines the Mistimed [semblance of a reason] which next presents itsslf.†

कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः ॥ ४९ ॥

The argument that is opposed by the evidence of the Senses.

No. 49.—That [semblance of a reason] is Mistimed which is adduced when the time is not [that when it might have availed.]

a. [For example,—suppose one argues that] Fire does not contain heat, because it is factitious,‡ [his argument is mistimed if we have already ascertained, by the superior evidence of the senses, that fire does contain heat].

b. Here concludes the topic of the Semblance of a reason.§

c. He now defines Fraud [or unfairness] which next presents itself.‖

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* यथाहि साध्यं साधनीयं तथा हेतुरपि चेत्साध्यसम इत्युच्यते। अत एवचासिद्ध इति व्यवह्रियते। अयञ्चाश्रयासिद्धिस्वरूपासिद्धिव्याप्यत्वासिद्धिभेदात्त्रिविधः ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तमतीतकालं लक्षयति ॥

‡ वह्निरनुष्णः कृतकत्वादिति ॥

§ समाप्तं हेत्वाभासप्रकरणम् ॥

‖ क्रमप्राप्तं छलं लक्षयति ॥

SECTION X.

OF THE TRICKS EMPLOYED BY THE DISHONEST DISPUTANT TO THWART THE OTHER PARTY.

वचनविघातो ऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्याच्छलम् ॥ ५० ॥

Wilfully unfair objections.

No. 50.—Unfairness [in disputation] is the opposing of what is propounded by means of assuming a different sense [from that which the objector well knows the propounder intended his terms to convey].

a. For example—in such a case of argument as this, that 'The man has come from Nepaul, because he has a new *(nava)* blanket [such as the country of Nepaul supplies],'—the declaring that this is not established, on the assumption that the meaning was *nine** [blankets, instead of a *new* blanket,—the word *nava* meaning both *new* and *nine*,—is unfair].

b. He now divides Fraud, which he has just defined.†

तत्त्रिविधं वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलञ्च ॥ ५१ ॥

No. 51.—It is of three kinds, (1) Fraud in respect of a term, (2) Fraud in respect of a genus, and (3) Fraud in respect of a trope.

a. Of these he now defines the 'Fraud in respect of a term.'‡

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* यथा नेपालादागतो ऽयं नवकम्बलवत्त्वादित्यत्र नवसंख्यापरत्वकल्पनयासिद्ध्यभिधानम् ॥

† लक्षितं छलं विभजते ॥

‡ तत्र वाक्छलं लक्षयति ॥

अविशेषाभिहिते ऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् ॥ ५२ ॥

The fraudulent misunderstanding of a term.

No. 52.—'Fraud in respect of a term' is the assuming a meaning other than [the objector well knows] was intended by the speaker when he named the thing by a term that happened to be ambiguous.

a. [An example of this has been given under §50. *a.*].

b. He next defines 'Fraud in respect of a genus.'*

सम्भवतो ऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम् ॥ ५३ ॥

The fraudulent over-straining of an assertion which was obviously not meant of the whole genus.

No. 53.—'Fraud in respect of a genus' is the assuming that something is spoken of in respect whereof the thing asserted is impossible, because [forsooth] this happens to be the same in kind with that of which the thing asserted *is* possible.

a. For example, on some one's saying, 'This is a Bráhman,—he must be possessed of learning and conduct';—the other, assuming that he here deduces the possession of learning and conduct from the fact of being a Bráhman, says—'How can that be?—for, the possession of learning and conduct, if deducible from the fact of being a Bráhman, would be found, where it cannot, in his *childhood*.'† [The other, of course, meant, as the objector very well knows, to speak of a Bráhman who has lived

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* सामन्यच्छलं लक्षयति ॥

† यथा ब्राह्मणो ऽयं विद्याचरणसम्पन्न इत्युक्ते ब्राह्मणत्वेन विद्याचरणसम्पदं साधयतीति कल्पयित्वा परो वदति कुतो ब्राह्मणत्वेन विद्याचरणसम्पद्बाल्ये व्यभिचारात् ॥

long enough in the world to render it possible for him to study, in which case the probability is that he will have studied].

b. He now defines 'Fraud in respect of a trope.'*

धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे ऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् ॥ ५४ ॥

The fraudulent acceptance of the metaphorical literally, and vice versa.

No. 54.—'Fraud in respect of a trope' is the denial of the truth of the matter, when the assertion was made in one or other of the modes, [viz. literal or metaphorical,—which it suits the purpose of the objector to invert].

a. For example, in the case of such an assertion as 'The scaffolds cry out' [—somewhat analogous to the English phraseology 'The pit and gallery applauded'—]; or 'The jar is blue'; [a dishonest opponent will say,] 'It is only *those standing* on the scaffolds that cry out, but not the *scaffolds*';—and, in like manner, [he will say,] 'How can a *jar* be the same thing as *blue*—which is [not a substance but] a colour?'† [In these cases the objector knows perfectly well that the assertion was not meant literally of the scaffolds, and that the jar was not asserted to be the colour blue, but a blue substance].

b. So too [conversely] it is a fraud in respect of a trope, when the assertion 'I am eternal' has been employed literally, to object 'How canst *thou* be eternal that was born of so and so?'‡

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* उपचारच्छलं लक्षयति ॥

† यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति नीलो घट इत्यादौ मञ्चस्था एव क्रोशन्ति नतु मञ्चाः । एवं घटस्य कथं नीलरूपाभेदः ॥

‡ एवं अहं नित्य इति भक्त्या प्रयुक्ते अमुकस्मादुत्पन्नत्वं कथं नित्य इति प्रतिषेधो ऽप्युपचारच्छलम् ॥

[Here the objector is supposed to know very well that the speaker employed the term 'I' to denote, what is regarded as the direct object of its denotation, the eternal spirit within him, and not his *body*, which he can only metaphorically call himself, and which, as the temporary prison-house of his soul, very possibly *was* born of so and so].

c. [If you ask why it is exactly that] a Fraud [such as has been described in §51, &c.] is not a valid reply, [it is] because it does not assail what the speaker meant to say.* [In the phraseology of European logic, it is a wilful *ignoratio elenchi* or misconception of what it is that is to be opposed].

d. And it must not be said that it is the *speaker* who is to blame for employing terms with a double meaning or with a metaphorical application; because the speaker is *not* to blame in employing a term that is notoriously understood as expressive of this or that meaning; else there would be an end put to every thing like reasoning by such objections as the following—viz., when a man says 'The mountain is fiery,' [the opponent, choosing to suppose that the term employed was not *vahnimán* 'fiery,' but *a-vahnimán* '*not* fiery'—the form, by the rules of euphonic combination in Sanskrit, being here the same in either case, might say] 'How is it that [you say] this mountain is *not* fiery?'†

e. He next takes a *primà facie* or incorrect view of Fraud

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* वाद्यभिप्रेतार्थस्यादूषणेन छलस्यासदुत्तरत्वम्॥

† नच श्लिष्टलाक्षणिके प्रयोगादादिन एवापराधः स्यादिति वाच्यं तत्तदर्थबोधकतया प्रसिद्धस्य शब्दस्य प्रयोगे वादिनोऽनपराधात्। अन्यथा पर्व्वतो वह्निमानित्युक्ते पर्व्वतोऽयं कथमवह्निमानित्यादिदूषणेनानुमानादुच्छेदः स्यात्॥

[—as it is one that is likely to occur to some readers, and one that may as well be disposed of]° whilst we are on the subject.*

वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तदविशेषात् ॥ ५५ ॥

The varieties of Fraud not to be confounded because they partially agree.

No. 55.—Fraud in respect of a trope [§54 —some one may fancy at first sight—] is just Fraud in respect of a term [§52], for it does not differ therefrom.

a. The meaning of this doubt is, that Fraud is only of two kinds, but not of three kinds; for Fraud in respect of a trope is just Fraud in respect of a term, seeing that these do not differ in being the assumption of a word's being used in another sense† [than that in which it was well enough known that the speaker did use it].

b. [This doubt] he clears up‡ [as follows].

न तदर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ५६ ॥

Things, though partially agreeing, may yet differ.

No. 56.—It is not so [—as supposed in §55—] because they do differ [although, it may be, agreeing in the respect just mentioned].

a. Since they may agree in some respect or other, even while they differ through the characters abovementioned [in §52—54] which have led to their being treated as separate, there would be no distinction anywhere [if we were to adopt the principle which would remove the distinction here], because there is everywhere

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* प्रसङ्गाच्छलं पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

† शब्दस्यार्थान्तरकल्पनाऽविशेषाद्वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं स्यादिति छलस्य द्वित्वमेव नतु त्रित्वमिति शङ्कार्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

no difference so far as regards a character common to the things severally* [—a man and a monkey, for example, or a jar and a web, being alike in so far as regards their being *substances*, but still requiring to be distinguished in respect of that in which they differ].

b. So, with the intention of showing that the opposite view involves an absurdity [such as has been noticed in §56. *a.*], he says† [as follows].

अविशेषे वा किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः॥ ५७॥

No. 57.—Or if there were no distinction where there is *any* similarity of character, we should have but *one* kind of Fraud.

a. That is to say—if no distinction is to result from any property whatever provided there be *some* similarity of nature, then Fraud, inasmuch as each variety thereof has a common character so far forth as each *is* a Fraud &c., would not be even of *two* sorts as you imagine [—see §55 *a.*], but of only *one.*‡.

b. Here concludes the topic of Fraud [in disputation.]§

c. He now defines Futility, which next presents itself.‖

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* पूर्वोक्तभेदकधर्म्मेण भेदसम्भवेऽपि यत्किञ्चिद्धर्म्मेणाभेदे सामान्यधर्म्मेणाभेदस्य सर्व्वत्र सम्भवाद्विभागः कुत्रापि न स्यादिति॥

† विपक्षे बाधकमभिप्रेत्याह॥

‡ यत्किञ्चिद्धर्म्मादविशेषे किञ्चित्साधर्म्याच्छलत्वादिरूपाच्छलस्यैक्यं स्यान्न तु त्वदभिमतं द्वित्वमपीति भावः॥

§ समाप्तं छलप्रकरणम्॥

‖ क्रमप्राप्तां जातिं लक्षयति॥

SECTION XI.

Of futile objections and hopeless stupidity.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः ॥ ५८ ॥

Futility, in an objection, what.

No. 58.—Futility consists in the offering of objections founded on [some mere] similarity or difference of character [—without regard to the question whether the fact asserted bears any invariable relation to that character].

a. The expression 'founded on similarity or difference of character' is a *definite* one [—intended to convey just so much, and to exclude everything beyond—]; therefore the meaning is this, that Futility consists in objecting, or taking exception, on the ground of a similarity or difference of character *without respect to invariableness of association or dissociation** [between the character and that whereof it is taken as a sign of the presence or the absence. For example, if it were propounded that 'The man is unfit to travel, because he has a fever,' it would be futile to object that 'The man *is* fit to travel, because he is a soldier'—there being no invariableness of connection between the being a soldier and the being fit to travel].

b. [As a syllogism with the Major premiss not universal but particular has no force at all]—so, [in consideration of the want of universality referred to in §58. *a.*,] it is implied that the futile reply—differing from a Fraud [§50]—is one that is powerless as an objection, [—whereas the objection, in the case of *ignoratio elenchi, has* power against the 'man of straw' which is fraudulent-

* साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामिति सावधारणो निर्देशस्तेन व्याप्तिनिरपेक्षाभ्यां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं दूषणाभिधानं जातिरित्यर्थः ॥

ly substituted for the argument of the opposite party—], or it is a reply that is self-destructive.*

c. He now defines Unfitness to be argued with—the topic which presents itself next in order.†

विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ ५९ ॥

The limit at which it becomes useless to argue further.

No. 59.—Unfitness to be argued with consists in one's [stupidly] misunderstanding, or *not* understanding at all.

a. The term here rendered 'Unfitness to be argued with' signifies literally the place, i. e. the suggester, of censure or rebuke;‡ [—for if a man stupidly misunderstands you or does not understand you at all, and yet still persists in trying to make a show of opposition, then the matter has come to that point where there is nothing left for it but to rebuke him as a blockhead, and to turn him out or quit his company].

b. In order to prevent the mistake, [into which some might fall, of supposing] that there is no subdivision of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with, [—the subdivisions of which will be stated in their proper place—] he says,§ [as follows].

तद्विकल्पाज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम् ॥ ६० ॥

No. 60.—Since they are of various kinds, there are many

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* छलादिभिन्नदूषणासमर्थमुत्तरं स्वव्याघातकमुत्तरं वा जातिरिति सूचितम् ॥

† क्रमप्राप्तं निग्रहस्थानं लक्षयति ॥

‡ निग्रहस्य स्वीकारस्य स्थानं ज्ञापकं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥

§ जातिनिग्रहस्थानयोर्विभागो नास्तीति भ्रमो मा भूदित्यत आह ॥

sorts of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with [—see §59. *b*.].

a. [But as other questions are more pressing] their subdivision is not made at present;—such is the import *[of the aphorism].

b. [Here ends the First Book of the commented Aphorisms of the Nyáya.]

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* नेदानीं तद्विभागः क्रियत इति भावः ॥

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APPENDIX

TO THE

FIRST LECTURE.

Review of Gautama's 1st Lecture.

a. Before going further, let us bestow a retrospective glance on this Lecture in which GAUTAMA lays down the plan of the whole Nyáya system; and let us enquire whether GAUTAMA's exposition is obnoxious to such a charge as is brought against it, for example,

The method of the Nyáya libelled in Europe.

by Dr. Ritter, who says, (at p. 366, Vol. IV. of the English version of his History of Philosophy), "In its exposition the Nyáya is tedious, loose, and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this Philosophy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic development of ideas, whatever knowledge they may have possessed of the external laws of composition." Setting aside the latter of these sentences, which has possibly been mistranslated, we venture to say that the Nyáya—up to the point that we have here reached in GAUTAMA's exposition of it—can be

Reasons why it is libelled.

tedious only to him who does not understand it or who has no taste for philosophical enquiries; that it can appear loose to any one only as the chain cable heaped upon the deck of a man of war appears loose in the eyes of the landsman who never saw it stretched; and that it can appear unmethodical only to him who has failed to discern its method. We blame no one for having failed to discern its method, but we do blame those, including Dr. Ritter,

who, having failed to discern it, take upon them to deny its existence. The method in GAUTAMA'S exposition is, one might think, sufficiently clear. Let us try to make it if possible clearer. Aiming at this, we shall now give our Synopsis of GAUTAMA'S method, noting, as we go along, the Aphorism to which our statements have reference.

Attempt to show why it ought not to be so libelled.

Estimate of Gautama's order of procedure.

b. GAUTAMA starts with the grand question of all questions—the enquiry as to how we shall attain the *summum bonum*,—the 'chief end of man,' as the Westminster Catechism literally represents the Sanskrit *paramapurushártha*. The general answer to this he states in his first aphorism—where he lays down further the position that deliverance from evil can be reached only through knowledge of the truth, [see §1].

c. Few are likely to dispute this first position [—those few being such as are to be remitted to the category noticed under §59], and the next question is,—have we *instruments* adapted to the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth? According to GAUTAMA we are furnished with four instruments adapted to this purpose. [These he enumerates in §3, and describes severally in §4—8].

d. But, if we have instruments, let us know what are the *objects*, in regard to which it is worth while obtaining a correct knowledge by means of the appropriate instruments. [These he enumerates in §9, and he defines them severally in §10—22].

e. But the bare enunciation and definiton of these Objects does not ensure a correct and believing knowledge of them. [The state intermediate between hearing and believing, viz. Doubt, he defines in §23].

f. But how is a man to get out of doubt? He will be content to remain in doubt if there be no *motive* for enquiring further.

[Here—§24—he takes occasion to explain what constitutes a Motive].

g. But, in every enquiry, to reach the unknown we must start from the *known*;—there must be *data*. The knowledge which, in any enquiry, we may treat as requiring no demonstration, is either popular—being that on which the unlearned and the learned are at one—the only ground available in dealing with the unlearned, [see §25]; or it is scientific—belonging to the schools, [see §26]. This latter, again, is divisible into four—viz., tenets received in every school [§ 27]; tenets peculiar to particular schools, and furnishing the grounds of *argumenta ad hominem* only [§29]; tenets postulated, and available only where the hypothesis is conceded [§30]; and tenets which, though not expressly laid down by the founders of the schools, are yet so clearly implied as to require no special demonstration, being inevitable Corollaries [§31].

h. The data being determined, it is proper to determine the order of procedure in demonstrating thereby something not granted. [This order of procedure is intimated in §32 and explicated in §33—38].

i. But, thus far, we have been shown an arrangement for hearing only one side of the question,* and how can we be sure that the opposite side is not the right one? [Before making up our minds we must hear both sides—§39—40].

j. But an honest enquirer may have heard both sides and still be in perplexity. Is he to be turned adrift? Not at all. Honest discussion, with one who holds the same first principles, is open to him [§41].

k. There are yet others, besides honest enquirers, that are not utterly to be rejected. A person, not hopelessly irreclaimable,

* Prov. XVIII, 17.

may shabbily *wrangle* for the sake of a seeming victory. [Here, therefore, he defines wrangling, §42].

l. A person, not perhaps hopelessly irreclaimable, may descend to even a lower depth of shabbiness than the wrangler, and may carp at others without undertaking to settle any thing himself. [Here, therefore, he defines cavilling, §43].

m. Wranglers and cavillers, in default of good reasons, must take up with bad ones—with what *look* like reasons; and even an honest enquirer may mislead himself by taking the semblance of a reason for a real one. [The various possible semblances of a reason he, therefore, defines and divides §44—49].

n. But, whilst there are fallacies by which a man may deceive himself as well as others, there are other frauds which are employed only dishonestly for the deception of others. [These frauds he defines and divides, §50—57].

o. Descending a stage lower, an opponent may employ objections so futile as to be capable of deceiving no one. It is well to know in what consists the futility of such objections. [This he shows—§ 58.]

p. Finally, an opponent, sinking even below the former one, (who *knew* what he was opposing though he could make none but a futile opposition), may be unable to understand the proposition [§59—60]. Here GAUTAMA's patience is exhausted, *but not before.* Against everything but that invincible combination of the spirit of contradiction with stupidity, he seeks to arm himself at all points. An objection the most frivolous—or even futile—provided it be tendered by one who understands the proposition—he does not refuse to deal with. The objection might perplex some honest enquirer, and therefore GAUTAMA, or the follower who has imbibed his spirit, does not consider himself entitled to consult his own ease by scouting it, though he himself

How it happens that very frivolous objections are gravely treated in the Nyáya.

may see its futility plainly enough. It is fair to remember this when we meet with ludicrously frivolous objections gravely treated in a Nyáya work. The author is not to be supposed to have *invented* the objection. It was offered to him—offered very possibly for the purpose of vexatiously puzzling and perplexing,—and the Naiyáyika will not allow himself to be puzzled and perplexed. The most cavilling opponent is not to be allowed the semblance of a victory; he shall not be allowed to boast even of having put the philosopher out of temper. This single triumph—such as it is—is reserved for the absolute blockhead.

q. Now, we should like to learn from the undervaluers of the *method* of the Nyáya, how could that method be much improved?

The undervaluers of the Nyáya invited to state where the order of procedure is misarranged, or what important matter there is for which the system provides no place.

You are not to imagine that you have answered this question when you have shown that there are some important matters not here noticed by GAUTAMA. You must be able to show either that there are important matters for which his system provides no place, or that he misarranges the order of procedure. We have explained his order of procedure, according to our own view of it. The enquiry whether there is any thing within the range of conception, for which his system does not furnish its appropriate place, we reserve for a separate essay.

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

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